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RECENT CASES
perhaps the time has come for the legislature to amend the criminal
code to provide, like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that:
"If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the
court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to
proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."'
GEORGE R. CREEDLE
NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER IN KENTUCKY THE RULE IN
MARYE v COMMONWEALTH'
What degree of negligence is reqmred in Kentucky for a conviction
of manslaughter? This question is of particular importance in Ken-
tucky since the statutes set out the punishment for voluntary man-
slaughter but do not attempt to define the elements of the crime.2
Involuntary manslaughter remains a common law crnme 3 with the
punishment being fixed by a general statute.4
In a case decided in 1919,5 where the homicide resulted from the
negligent operation of an automobile, the tort standard of care was
applied and on a finding of ordinary negligence the defendant was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Seven years later in a similar
case involving a homicide resulting from the negligent operation of
an automobile,6 the court said that failure to exercise ordinary care
in the driving of an automobile was sufficient negligence to constitute
the crime of involuntary manslaughter. These cases were followed in
Kentucky, and the law seemed to be settled that ordinary negligence
in the operation of an automobile was sufficient to authorize a con-
viction of involuntary manslaughter.7
As one might expect, since the court had resorted to the rule that
ordinary negligence was sufficient to constitute involuntary man-
slaughter, when it was later confronted with a case involving a greater
degree of negligence and consequently deserving a greater degree of
punishment, the natural solution was to convict the guilty party of
- FED. R. Crm. P. 44.
1240 S.W 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.020 (1948).3 Sikes v. Com., 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W 2d 956 (1947).
'Ky. Rmv. STAT. see. 431.075 (1950).
'Held v. Com., 183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W 772 (1919).
'Jones v. Com., 213 Kv. 356, 281 S.W 164 (1926).
'Lewis v. Com., 301 Ky. 268, 191 S.W 2d 416 (1945); Lowe v. Com., 298
Ky. 7, 181 S.W 2d 409 (J944); Com. v. Mullins, 296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W 2d 403(1943).
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voluntary manslaughter. That is exactly what was done. Various
phrases were used to describe this higher degree of negligence re-
quired for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter,-such phrases as
"reckless conduct",8 "reckless or gross" 9 "reckless disregard",1 ° "reck-
less and wanton",i "grossly careless",12 and "gross negligence" 13
Even though various phrases were used, it appears that involuntary
manslaughter could be committed by ordinary civil negligence while
any negligence of a higher degree would authorize a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter.
In the recent case of Marye v Commonwealth'4 the court was
confronted with the extreme harshness of the rule as it applies to
involuntary manslaughter. In that case two homicides resulted from
the negligent driving of an automobile by the defendant who was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter on a finding of ordinary civil
negligence. On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals in a well writ-
ten opinion by Judge Combs, although recognizing the rule estab-
lished by prior decisions, expressly overruled these cases and held
that ordinary negligence, though sufficient in a civil suit, was not suf-
ficient for a criminal prosecution; that in order to convict one of in-
voluntary manslaughter there must be a finding of "gross negligence."
This case which places Kentucky in accord with the great weight
of authority on this question 15 thus becomes one of the landmark
decisions in the state. It not only changes the law as to the negligence
required for involuntary manslaughter but will also have repercus-
sions as to the negligence required for voluntary manslaughter. In
discussing the relationship between voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter Judge Combs said:
"It is our view that instructions in voluntary manslaughter
cases should require a finding of reckless and wanton conduct, and
instructions in involuntary manslatighter cases should require a finding
of gross negligence in order to adthorize a conviction. We think that
if the terms gross negligence and reckless and wanton conduct' are
correctly defined in the instructions, the jury will have a practical
working basis upon which to render an intelligent verdict.""o
It is respectfully submitted that this paragraph is the weak spot
'Rmns v. Com., 226 Ky. 173, 10 S.W 2d 643 (1928).
'Thacker v. Com., 263 Ky. 97, 91 S.W 2d 998 (1936).
"Boggs v. Com., 285 Ky. 558, 148 S.W 2d 703 (1941).
"Haupe v. Com., 234 Ky. 27, 27 S.W 2d 394 (1930).
'2 Hill v. Com., 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W 2d 261 (1931).
" Newcomb v. Com., 276 Ky. 362, 124 S.W 2d 486 (1939).
u Supra, note 1.
' MILLER, CRIIUNAL LAw 287 (1934); MORELAND, RATIONALE OF CIinNAL
NEGLIGENCE 16 (1944); 65 Con. JUR. SECUN. 1270 (1950); 61 Con. JUR. SECUN.
774 (1949); 40 Con. Jur. SECUN. 924 (1944).
16240 S.W 2d 852, 855 (Ky. 1951).
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in tis important and well reasoned opinion. By way of dictum the
court approved the cases holding voluntary manslaughter could be
committed by a high degree of negligence. It may well be doubted
whether negligence, however great, can ever amount to a voluntary
act.17 Ballentine defines voluntary manslaughter as an intentional
killing of a human being in sudden heat and passion without malice
and under reasonable provocation.iS May in his work on criminal law
states that it is voluntary manslaughter if it was committed with a
real design to kill."' The Kentucky court in cases involving voluntary
manslaughter by negligence2 0 reasons that in such situations one must
be held to intend the natural consequences of his act and by this
method reaches the conclusion that such negligent acts are voluntary
If the Kentucky courts are going to continue to use this fiction it is
hard to see how they can make voluntary manslaughter out of "reck-
less and wanton conduct" and at the same time refuse to apply the
same reasoning to "gross negligence" and thus make that voluntary
manslaughter also. One can readily see the uncertain and precarious
situation such a doctrine would lead to. The important question is,
Is such a doctrine sound?
The court states in the paragraph above quoted that they believe
that if the terms "gross negligence" and "reckless and wanton conduct"
are correctly defined they will serve as a practical working basis to
differentiate voluntary from involuntary manslaughter. Is this a
reasonable ground for distinguishing them? It is submitted that it is
not. Here are three words, "gross" "reckless", and "wanton." "Gross"
and "reckless" have been so universally used as synonyms, even by
the Kentucky court itself, that few citations are necessary to show
their similarity of connotation,21 yet the court says one denotes an act
which is involuntary and the other an act which will be held to be
voluntary The court, continuing its discussion, not only attempts to
distinguish between "gross" and "recklTes" but also uses the words
"reckless" and "wanton" synonymously Professor Moreland in a re-
cent extended study on methods which are useful in describing crim-
inal negligence came to the conclusion that wantonness, defined as
" MORELAND, RATIONALE OF CRm niNAL NEGLIGENCE 37 (1944).
" BALLENTINE, LAw DICTIONARY vITH PRONUNCIATIONS 1347 (1930).
"'MAY, CRIMINAL LAW 272 (4th ed. 1938).
="Largent v. Com., 265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W 2d 538 (1936); King v. Com., 253
Ky. 775, 70 S.W 2d 667 (1934); Embry v. Com., 236 Ky. 204, 32 S.W 2d 979(1931).
- Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940); Thacker v. Com.,
263 Ky. 97, 91 S.W 2d 998 (1936); Pelfrey v. Com., 247 Ky. 484, 57 S.W 2d
474 (1933); La Plante v. Rousseau, 91 N.H. 330, 18 A. 2d 777 (1941); Thomas
v. Southern Lumber Co., 181 S.W 2d 111 (Tex. 1944); PROssEn, TORTS 262
(1941).
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arrogant recklessness, 22 was one of the most satisfactory descriptions
of the state of mind required for the negligent murder 23 This is the
rule which has been adopted m most jurisdictions. 24 It is apparent
that "wanton conduct", which is generally defined as arrogant reck-
lessness is a higher degree of negligence than "reckless conduct" and
yet the court uses them as synonyms.
It may be argued that m using the phrases "gross negligence" and
"reckless and wanton" to distinguish between involuntary and volun-
tary manslaughter the Kentucky court did not intend to use the words
"reckless and wanton" as synonyms but rather as a phrase, which
when read in its entirity denotes the conduct which will be held to be
voluntary If tis was the intention of the court, and such an in-
terpretation seems reasonable, it is submitted that the use of the words
"reckless" and "wanton" conjunctively may cause substantial uncer-
tainty in the application of the rule. As has been shown above,
"wanton" conduct is best defined as arrogant recklessness and thus is
something much greater than "reckless" conduct. Joining the word
"reckless" conjunctively to the word "wanton" can add nothing what-
soever to the connotation which the word "wanton" carries by itself,
for "reckless" conduct is included within, and is something less than,
"wanton" conduct. Therefore in order to avoid the unnecessary con-
fusion it would seem reasonable to omit the word "reckless" from the
phrase. The effect of the decision m the Marye case would then be to
hold "gross negligence" sufficient to authorize a conviction of invol-
untary manslaughter, while "wanton" conduct would, m Kentucky,
constitute voluntary manslaughter.
In summarizing what has been said with respect to the Marye case
it will facilitate clarification to note briefly the main features of the
above discussion: (1) The decision is fundamentally sound m that it
requires a higher degree of negligence for a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter than is required in a civil suit. (2) The use of the phrase
"gross negligence" to describe the higher degree of negligence re-
qured was an unfortunate choice of language because of the vague-
ness of the term. Furthermore the statement by the court to the effect
that "gross negligence" should be defined as the "failure to exercise
slight care" is subject to strong criticism. Is not the failure to exercise
slight care practically no care at all? It would seem that such a defini-
tion would be much too advantageous to the defendant. (8) The
phrase "reckless and wanton" as describing the conduct which will
WEBSTER s NEw INTERNATiONAL DicTONARY 2871 (2d ed. 1938).SOp. cit. supra, note 17 at 68.
Op. cit. supra, note 17, 62 et. seq., and cases there cited.
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authorize a conviction of voluntary manslaughter is ambiguous. If the
words were intended to be used as synonyms, then the distinction be-
tween that conduct and "gross negligence" is very vague and uncertain
for "reckless" and "gross" have similar connotations. Further, if the
phrase was used to describe the highest degree of negligence, which
is usually described as "wanton", the word "reckless" is superfluous
and misleading. (4) The court by way of dictum approved the doe
trine of the wantonly negligent voluntary manslaughter, which on its
face is illogical and subject to vigorous criticism; however, much of
such criticism of the doctrine should be directed at the state legis-
lature rather than to the courts. The legislature has by statute limited
the punishment for all common law crimes, the punishment for which
is not provided for by statute, to a maximum imprisonment of one
year.2 - , This statute eliminates the possibility of pumshing wanton
homicides as negligent murders m this state because of the insufficient
penalty As a result of this statute the courts are placed m the difficult
position of providing a sufficient penalty for conduct which in most
other jurisdictions would be murder.26 Is it not reasonable that the
court would resort to the use of fictions m order to find voluntary
manslaughter so as to sufficiently punish the defendant where he is
guilty of a high degree of negligence? The voluntary manslaughter
statute carries a maximum imprisonment of twenty-one years.2 7 It is
obvious that the burden of clarifying the Kentucky homicide law rests
largely with the state legislature. The need for statutory reform is
imperative m order more successfully to execute this phase of the
criminal law of the state.281 This need is emphasized by several recent
newspaper editorials vigorously criticizing various definitions in the
Marve case.2 9
ROBERT C. MOFFIT
'Ky. R1v. STAT. see. 431.075 (1950).
' Supra, note 24.
' Ky. REV. STAT. see. 435.020 (1948).
' It is interesting to note for the record that on the new trial ordered in the
Marye case the defendant was acquitted due to a failure to find the required degree
of negligence. Lexington Herald, October 12, 1951, 1.
' See for example, the following two editorials: Lexington Leader, Nov. 13,
1951, 4; Lexington Leader, Oct. 26, 1951, 4. In the latter it was said: "To obtain
a conviction in an involuntary manslaughter case, the court has held, the common-
wealth must prove that the defendant failed to exercise slight care in the opera-
tion of his automobile. Since it would be virtually impossible for anyone to drive
a motor vehicle a half-block without exercising slight care, the legislature cer-
tainly owes it to the people of Kentucky to put some teeth in the law. Otherwise,
traffic deaths will be legal killing."
